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Abstract: Predetermined islanding scenarios along with 
automated load shedding schemes are applied once a prospective 
cascading outage condition is predicted. If required, additional 
distributed generation at specified locations in the system is also 
determined. The choice of different islands along with loads to be 
shed is then made available to the operator so as to be armed for 
action in case the system security is compromised. Determination 
of line outages that lead to disastrous consequences, intentional 
islanding schemes, and load shedding schemes have been 
explored individually. A plan integrating these defense 
mechanisms coupled with the possibility of using distributed 
generation where and when available is presented via case 
studies. Results obtained from the application of this technique 
indicate that it can be a powerful approach for secure operation 
of power systems. 
 
Keyword: Catastrophic failure, blackout, countermeasures, load 
shedding, distributed generation. 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
YSTEM blackout is the state when the complete system or large 
areas of it may completely collapse. This state is usually 
preceded by a sequence of cascading failure events that knock 
out transmission lines and generating units. Any large disruption in 
generation and load balance in a massively interconnected system, as 
seen in the North American interconnections, can lead to undesirable 
variations in power flows and bus voltages. Occasionally, this 
imbalance can spread uncontrollably over an entire system causing 
blackout of large parts of the system. Although the reasons behind 
blackouts can vary from instance to instance, certain themes are 
evident from historically reported blackouts. Some of those deal with 
the level of interconnection, transmission line capacities, proximity 
of an event to major generation and loads, and how much power is 
already moving across areas. 
Major blackouts very often result in a condition when some 
areas detach from the rest of the system causing power imbalance, 
the subsystem is said to be islanded. To contain the cascading 
outages several corrective and preventive schemes are being 
discussed in the research community [1-3]. Some of the schemes 
reported in the literature include system splitting strategies [4], slow 
coherency-based islanding [5] and various load shedding schemes- 
undervoltage load shedding (UVLS) [6], under-frequency load 
shedding (UFLS) [7]. Yet, because of lack of pre-planned separation 
of the system, absence of fast control measures, inadequate planning 
and operation studies for emergencies and other events that are near 
impossible to predict are the reasons blackouts continue to occur. 
This paper introduces some blackout mitigation techniques that 
are based on simple rules, such as, strategic tripping of overloaded 
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lines near the initial failure, followed by rational load shedding. In 
some cases, when load shedding does not help solve the problem, 
premeditated islanding is carried out. The removal of small amounts 
of loads tends to isolate the failure and prevent it from spreading. 
This prevents additional lines from becoming overloaded, thus 
helping avoid further outages. 
The existing imbalance between generation capacity and 
transmission capacity together with percentage loading of lines, 
percentage loading of generators, voltage levels and interchange 
level are major contributors to cascading failures. This paper 
enumerates, by case studies, methods to seize a cascading failure as 
soon as the initiating event can be identified. The methodology 
consists of exploring the use of predetermined islanding scenarios 
along with automated load shedding schemes. If required, additional 
distributed generation at specified locations in the system is also 
determined. The choice of island boundaries along with specific 
loads and the amount to be shed is then made available to the 
operator. A plan outlining the integration of all the three defense 
mechanisms is also provided. 
A.  Cascading Failure - Blackout 
Large blackouts are usually the outcome of cascading outages. 
In a typical scenario, the disturbance spreads quickly because of 
protective relays installed at critical nodes disconnected the key 
components in an attempt to isolate the damage. Other factors such 
as failure to trim trees under power lines, failing to rectify line sags 
and so on contributed to initiate the documented blackouts. Table 1 
gives a summary of the blackouts occurred in North America over 
the years.  
TABLE 1. MAJOR NORTH AMERICAN BLACKOUTS [8] 
   Date Location Load Interrupted 
November 9, 1965 Northeast 20,000 MW 
July 13, 1977 New York 6,000 MW 
December 22, 1982 West Coast 12,350 MW 
January 17, 1994 California 7,500 MW 
December 14, 1994 Western US 9,336 MW 
July 2, 1996 Western US 11,743 MW 
August 10, 1996 Western US 30,489 MW 
June 25, 1998 Midwest 950 MW 
August 14, 2003 Northeast 61,800 MW 
II.  POWER SYSTEM SECURITY – ASSESSMENT AND DEFENSE SCHEMES 
Security of a power system refers to the degree of risk in its 
ability to survive imminent disturbances (contingencies) without 
interruption of customer service. It relates to robustness of the system 
to imminent disturbances and, hence, depends on the system 
operating condition as well as the contingent probability of 
disturbances [9]. 
A widely applied security assessment is contingency analysis. 
System analysis gives information about the oncoming tribulations. 
Pertinent up-to-date information on the system conditions can be 
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readily available to the system operator. This information is the 
outcome of offline system studies with real time network data. 
The most common defense schemes devoted to circumventing 
wide-area disturbances are under-voltage load shedding, under-
frequency load shedding, system separation (islanding), etc. 
A.  Islanding 
As often seen, sometimes, during a disturbance, the system 
tends to break up into islands. This occurs on account of the tripping 
measures adopted by the grid’s protective systems. Undervoltages 
created in such situations aggravate the existing condition and lead to 
individual island failures. Unintentional or natural islanding has the 
potential to damage equipment and compromise system security [4]. 
On the other hand, to prevent system failure during extreme 
emergencies, it is sometimes recommended to execute controlled 
splitting of the system into stable islands with generation and/or load 
shedding using special protection schemes. Controlled islands are 
more stable than the unintentionally formed islands. They are also 
less prone to collapse and do not aggravate existing conditions that 
lead to blackouts. However, these islands may still suffer from 
generation-load imbalances. To eliminate undesired consequences of 
a power imbalance, load or generation shedding is executed. The 
islanded areas can be pre-planned, and specified by offline studies. 
B.  Distributed Generation 
Distributed generation has the potential to improve the 
reliability of the power system. It can reduce the need for new 
transmission lines. It can also be configured to meet the varying 
power demands. Distributed generation is usually either conventional 
or renewable. They are usually located close to the customer load. 
With careful planning and wise-spread adoption distributed 
generation can help stabilize the system and sometimes prevent 
blackouts. It can play a vital role in maintaining the generation-load 
balance in intentional islanding schemes by ensuring that each area is 
balanced. However, an oft-mentioned disadvantage of distributed 
generation is that it may not be available at the desired locations. 
C.  Load Shedding 
Load shedding is sometimes executed to reduce the imbalance 
and reestablish the normal operating conditions in time to avoid 
system collapse. Under normal and unexpected emergency 
conditions voltage levels are maintained by undervoltage load 
shedding (UVLS). By identifying the weakest nodes in the system, 
the quantity and location of loads to shed is determined. Load 
shedding is an effective low cost measure to maintain normal 
operation during emergency conditions. 
III.  METHODOLOGY 
A technique to predict and quickly analyze effective defense 
mechanisms following the outage of critical lines is presented in this 
paper. System studies can provide information on lines that are at or 
near capacity, lightly loaded lines and undervoltages/overvoltages. 
Potential line outages that may cause cascading outages are also 
analyzed by executing contingency analysis. The weaker areas of the 
system are then defined, a list of weak nodes is prepared, and 
probable island ties are devised. A simple and practical load shedding 
scheme for a reliable island operation is also formulated. 
A.  Selection of the Initiating Disturbance 
Large blackouts are the common outcome of cascading outages 
in a power system. Uncontrolled cascading events are initiated by the 
loss of major transmission lines, as observed in both the 1996 [10, 
11] and the 2003 blackouts [12, 13]. Depending on how the system 
components are related, a disturbance can cause either a local 
interruption or create widespread cascading actions. This 
consequence is unpredictable and requires regular and systematic 
system analysis to keep the operator aware of any limitation or 
system stresses. For this study, a set of contingencies were pre-
selected as reported in the companion paper [14]. 
B.  Determining Pre-Disturbance Island Boundaries 
Defining island boundaries just prior to an impending 
disturbance is not possible since the disturbance cannot be predicted. 
However, some island boundaries may be loosely defined based on 
continuously monitoring the line flows and calculating the line 
outage distribution factors (LODF). The transmission lines which are 
near capacity have the tendency to trip during system disturbances. 
These lines are closely observed while conducting load flow studies 
and contingency analysis. Such lines together with geographical 
aspects of the grid are taken into consideration while selecting island 
ties. 
The islands formed are assessed for independent operation. 
Some islands may not be able to survive independently, inducing the 
requirement for load/generation shedding or undervoltage load 
shedding. To preserve the power balance, additional power in the 
form of distributed generation may be required. 
Fig. 1 illustrates the basic steps involved in developing the 
projected technique. System data for a critical line outage condition 
is studied for line overloads and bus undervoltages. Voltages and line 
flows are the foremost indicators of system conditions. 
Depending on system studies, a self-healing scheme and/or a 
practical strategy may be deployed. This practical strategy includes 
the islanding boundary definition and/or the self-healing scheme 
which includes load/generation shedding and additional generation. 
C.  Determining the location and amount of load shedding 
An exhaustive search is engaged to determine the loads required 
to be shed to return the system to its nominal operating condition. 
Although load shedding is considered as the last resort; it is a method 
of reducing the load to restore the system power balance. 
Fig. 1. The basic steps in the methodology 
Determining the amount of load that needs to be shed is the 
chief problem involved. The critical event leading to an extensive 
cascading failure in Ohio and beyond during the August 2003 
blackout, was the tripping a single line Sammis-Star 345-kV line 
[12]. The tripping was executed as a defensive measure against line 
overload and undervoltage at the buses. That and the similar tripping 
of a few other lines resulted in an unavoidable system blackout. The 












critical tripping of the Sammis line, would have helped to contain the 
problem and prevented the system collapse. 
Many methodologies have been proposed to ascertain the 
amount of load that is appropriate to shed under given conditions. 
Shedding load more than that required may create overvoltages or 
aggravate the existing situation. Similarly, tripping less amount of 
load will defeat the purpose and be ineffective in preventing 
cascading outages. 
By calculating the power drawn by the load before and after the 
line outage the amount to be shed can be determined. This design is 
developed taking into account the predetermined critical line outage 
and island boundaries. 
The location where the load is to be shed is a key factor that 
should be considered. For example, if the loss of a critical line causes 
an overload on a neighboring line, then the load connected at one of 
the ends of the line is considered first.  Shedding applied to any of 
the neighboring buses by a percentage varying from 25% to 100%, 
may help relieve the overload. The objective is to avoid a system 
blackout which is achieved by implementing shedding schemes. 
Load shedding is not generally recommended except during critical 
conditions, such as critical contingencies. 
D.  Design Procedure 
Since protecting the system against all possible contingencies is 
evidently impractical, the fundamental principle is to secure the 
system against only the critical contingencies. The analyses will 
assess bus voltages and line loadings against specified system 
constraints. The defense technique comprises of the following: 
(1) System power flow studies. 
(2) Contingency analyses. 
(3) Diverse islanding scenarios for predetermined disturbances. 
(4) Load shedding schemes based on overloads and undervoltages. 
(5) Additional generation initiated at selected buses. 
For a reliable operation, the constraints that need to be satisfied, 
after the defense scheme has returned the system from an emergency 
condition to an operating state, are: 
(1) System bus voltages should remain within limits. 
(2) Line flows must not exceed the line’s maximum loading limit. 
(3) Number of loads sheds should be minimum. 
(4) Additional generation at a bus: less than 100MW. 
(5) Adequate spinning reserves exist (7%-10%). 
Fig. 2 outlines the steps and shows how the different protective 
measures are incorporated together to generate the desired result, i.e., 
reliable system operation with lower level of security. System 
operation with lower level of security implies that the system is 
restored to an operable condition but may or may not be N-1 secure. 
System security is compromised but operation is guaranteed. N-1 
criterion ensures the secure and reliable operation of the power 
system. It means that the system will operate normally and that the 
power is delivered reliably even when one of the lines is lost. 
The load-generation power balance gives an evaluation of the 
system condition. If the total generation is greater than the total load, 
then the system is in a power surplus situation. In this state, shedding 
the generation will help rectify the problem. Surplus power in any 
system may cause overvoltages or line overloads. But, if the system 
is deficient in power, then either loads need to be shed or additional 
generation should be brought in. 
If load shedding does not relieve the undervoltages or line 
overloads, then additional generation between the ranges of 25 MW 
to 100 MW is applied. The bus, at which generation is installed, is 
selected using the same technique as load shedding. If the system 
consists of lines which are near capacity or have low maximum flow 
limits then it may require both load shedding and additional 
generation to restore the system. The addition of generation to the 
system is explained as an extension of this scheme. Fig. 3 depicts the 
steps involved. The algorithm given in the figure is used to determine 
if reducing generation alleviates the crisis, how much generation 
needs to be decreased and at which bus it is to be applied. 
E.  Optimal Scheme 
Alternative schemes deal with achieving system reliable 
operation without the execution of island formation. For some system 
conditions, by adding generation at certain buses and/or shedding 


























Fig. 2. Overview of the procedure 
The algorithm sketched out in Fig. 4 is self explanatory, where 
it describes the load shedding scheme devised to eliminate system 
violations. The shedding scheme developed is a simple yet efficient 
way to combat the causes that create critical conditions in the system.  
If adding a generator helps resolve the problem, it must be 
limited to less than 100 MW at a bus. If the generation deficiency is 
100 MW, then this amount is split up and spread out to other buses to 
accommodate the constraint. It may not be possible to have the 
required amount of distributed generation at hand. In such cases, load 
shedding is employed to help the situation. 
Even if the system is islanded into smaller areas, the scheme 
described in Fig. 4 for load shedding does not need any 
modifications. Load flow studies are conducted several times in this 
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Fig. 3. Generation addition/reduction algorithm 
Intentional Islanding to Avoid Cascading Outages 
Intentional, forced or controlled islanding is probably the best 
venture put together for tackling emergency conditions. The data of 
island boundaries is then used to provide information to the system to 
implement the exact island condition in the system. Flowchart for the 
proposed scheme to prevent system blackouts due to cascading 
blackouts is given in Fig. 5. 
After the procedure is set with various island cases, it is checked 
for system reliability. If the islands cannot survive independently due 
to system constraint violations, then a load shedding scheme is 
applied to lead the islands to nominal operating conditions. Each 
island scenario for the specified outage is considered and analyzed.  
The final outputs of this technique are independent islands 
capable of operating under reduced generation or load conditions for 
each of the critical line outages. This scheme is verified using the 
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Fig. 4. Load shedding and additional generation placement algorithm (OL = 
line overloads, UV = undervoltages, OV = overvoltages) 
IV.  TEST RESULTS 
A.  System diagram and operating conditions 
The IEEE 118 bus test system, shown in Fig. 6 is used for 
testing the cascading outage schemes. Four principle areas are 
defined in the system as shown in the diagram. The 4 areas constitute 
the natural pre-disturbance islands. These pre-defined island 
boundaries are used to determine similar island boundaries during 
critical cascading circumstances. There are 118 buses, 186 lines with 
bus 65 being the swing bus. Island boundaries were predetermined 
based on the procedure outlined in an earlier section. The criteria 
used for determination of these islands were: 
(1) Generation-load balance 
(2) System bus voltages should remain within limits 
(3) Line flows must not exceed loading limit. 
(4) The number of loads shed should be less than 5 




























Fig. 5.  Flowchart of Proposed Scheme 
The areas and the different tie lines are listed in Table 2. The 
area ties are predominantly heavily loaded lines, making them 
excellent candidates for island boundaries. During system outages or 
disturbances, these lines may violate their limits, causing them to 
trip. By defining them as the island ties, forced outage of these lines 
as a mitigation measure is in fact conducive to the situation. In the 
process of islanding, loss of these ties may cause overloads on other 
lines. 
B.  Critical Contingencies 
Owing to the large size of the power grid, numerous 
contingencies have to be assessed. Out of these, only a handful can 
create worst case scenarios. A total of 13 critical contingencies were 
identified which could potentially result in cascading outages, 
leading to a system blackout in each case [14]. Out of these, only five 
are shown in this paper for reasons of brevity. Detailed system 
analysis has shown that cascading failures were triggered by one of 
these single outages eventually capable of producing a sequence of 
events leading to system-wide failures.  Blackout mitigation schemes 
are tested for these five critical contingencies. 
TABLE 2 PRE-DETERMINED ISLAND TIES 
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94 - 100; 
98 - 100; 
99 - 100 
 
      - 
C.  Case 1 – Outage of Line 4-5 
This outage falls in Area-1 of the 118-bus test system and it is a 
line component with a loading of over 75%. Loss of this power path 
will require the neighboring lines to adjust and provide 
compensations as shown in Fig. 7. Large amounts of power was 
being transferred from bus 5 to bus 4 to serve the loads in this area. 
This power is supplied predominantly by the large generators at 
buses 10 and 26. The power that was being fed by line 4-5 to the load 
is now shared by lines 3-5, 5-6, 5-11, 6-7 and 7-12. 
Under pre-disturbance conditions line 5-11 was loaded to 67% 
of its maximum capacity. But losing line 4-5, - a heavily loaded line; 
overloads line 5-11 to about 120%. This can cause the line to be 
tripped out by relaying equipment, initiating a sequence of cascading 
events leading to a possible system blackout. 
Appropriate islanding scenarios, load shedding and additional 
generation are executed to thwart the cascading failure and 
eliminating the overload on line 5-11 in its course. Load shedding 
and placement of the required additional generation is determined by 
the proposed scheme described earlier. Table 3 illustrates the 
different schemes adopted to avoid a probable blackout condition, 
bringing the system to an operable condition without any system 
constraint violations. Scheme-1 operates the system in an islanded 
condition. There are two islands formed which are capable of 
operating independently with the help of additional generation and 
load shedding. 
For Area-1, generation is added at bus 11 to alleviate the 
overload on 5-11, and the load at bus 36 is dropped. Disconnecting 
the island ties for the formation of the two areas create undervoltages 
at buses 36 and 38. Clearly, Scheme-2 is the superior alternative. It 
requires additional generation of 75 MW at bus 11 without 
instigating any island configuration. 
No load shedding is required in this case. Turning on generation 
of 75 MW in the form of distributed generation is feasible. Other 
alternatives include schemes 3 and 4, where only load shedding (i.e., 
without the application of additional generation) is employed. Since, 
there is no assurance that distributed generation will be available at 




Fig. 6.  The 118-bus test system. 
 
 
Fig. 7. Line 4-5 Outage 
TABLE 3. MITIGATION SCHEMES FOR LINE OUTAGE: 4-5 
Scheme 
     (#) 
   Details of the 





       1 Island 1- Area 1        1 75 MW 
       1 Island 2- Area 2-3-4        0 50 MW 
       2 Entire System        0 75 MW 
       3 Entire System        1 - 
       4 Island 1- Area 1        3 - 
       4 Island 2- Area 2-3-4        1 - 
D.  Case 2 – Outage of transformer 37-38 
Losing a transformer can cause severe violations. It creates 
numerous undervoltages in Area-1 and Area-2. The power that is 
being distributed by this transformer is fed to the loads at buses 33, 
34, 35, 39and 40. As shown in Fig. 8, this transformer carries power 
from the large generators at buses 10, 26 and 65. 
Therefore, outage of this transformer causes undervoltages at 
buses 33, 34, 35, 36, 37 and 43. Undervoltages are partially due to 
the insufficiency of reactive power flow, requiring the need for 
supplemental generation. Overloads on lines 15-33, 19-34, 40-42 and 
43-44 is the result of a division of the flow distribution. Line 15-33 is 
the overloaded the most since it has to provide the lost power to the 
load at bus 33. The only other line initially providing power to this 
load was 33-37 through 37-38. 
Table 4 lists the different schemes to keep the system operating 
at reliable conditions. Either by shedding a load and/or adding 
generation at 33 and 34 facilitates operable conditions in the system. 
Depending on the circumstances, either of the schemes can be 
selected by the operator. 
TABLE 4. MITIGATION SCHEMES FOR LINE OUTAGE: 37-38 
Scheme 
   (#) 
  Details of the 





    1  Entire System          1         50 MW 
    2  Entire System          2            - 
E.  Case 3 – Outage of line 38-65 
This line is a tie-line for Area-1 and Area-2 and carries large 
amounts of power with a percentage loading of 65 %. It supplies 
power to Area-1 from where it is distributed out to supply the load 
demands in Areas 1 and 2. Outage of this line causes several line 
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overloads without considerable voltage fluctuations, clearly shown in 
Fig. 9. Both the areas suffer the consequences of the outage. 
 
Fig. 8. Line 37-38 Outage 
 
Fig. 9. Line 38-65 Outage 
Inadequate maintenance of power supply among the load buses 
is the reason for the overloads. This is alleviated by providing extra 
generation at two buses; generation of 50 MW at buses 1 and 2 each. 
Since buses 1 and 2 are further away from the point of outage, they 
are not selected. Additional generation of 25 MW in Area-1 is 
desired for this scheme. Scheme 2 is evidently the better choice as 
seen from Table 5, even though it requires islanding the system into 
two areas. 
TABLE 5. MITIGATION SCHEMES FOR LINE OUTAGE: 38-65 
Scheme 
   (#) 
    Details of the 
       Scheme 
Loads 
Shed 
      Gen 
     Added 
    1   Entire System           0 100 MW 
    2  Island 1- Area 1-2           0 25 MW 
    2 Island 2- Area 3-4           0            0 
    3  Entire System           3            - 
    4 Island 1- Area 1           1            - 
    4 Island 2-Area 2-3-
4 
          1            - 
     5 Island 1- Area 1-2           3            - 
     5 Island 2- Area 3-4           0            - 
F.  Case 4 – Outage of line 64-65 
The line is located in Area-2, and has a percentage loading of 
66%, distributing power through transformers to loads at buses 56, 
57, 62, 66, and 67 as shown in Fig. 10. 
The overloads on lines 62-66, 62-67 and 66-67 are the result of 
the line outage taking away the path for power flow to supply the 
demand. As listed in the Table 6, the various schemes are able to 
restore operable condition to the system. Scheme 1, where islanding 
is not an option, an additional generation of 50 MW each is required 
at four buses (39, 55, 60 and 62). The distribution of additional 
generation is executed to in this fashion supply the maximum power 
possible to the load without causing any line overloads. Employing 
load shedding exclusively is advised in the case of absence of 
distributed generation in this area. 
 
Fig. 10. Line 64-65 Outage 
TABLE 6. MITIGATION SCHEMES FOR LINE OUTAGE: 64-65 
Scheme 
   (#) 
   Details of the 
      Scheme 
Loads 
Shed 
     Gen 
    Added 
1  Entire System       0    200 MW 
2* Island 1- Area 2       1         - 
2* Island 2- Area 1-
3-4 
      2         - 
3   Entire System       2         - 
Scheme 2* involves islands of Area-1 and Area 2-3-4, but the 
island boundaries have been modified to help the situation. Since the 
outage involves a generator bus, designated as the slack bus, more 
than four loads need to be shed to help the situation. Since the outage 
involves a generator bus, designated as the slack bus, more than four 
loads need to be shed to help the situation. In order to avoid this, 
Area-1 boundaries have been changed from the original case which 
included buses 1 - 38 to the modified case that included buses 1 - 42. 
The part of the system consisting of buses 39 to 42 have been known 
to create overloads due to the insufficient generation. This helps to 
reduce the number of loads shed in Area 2-3-4. 
G.  Case 5 – Outage of line 89-92 
This is a line in Area-3 which carries huge amounts of power 
since bus 89 is connected to the largest generator in the entire 
system. The outage of line 89-92 creates the most number of 
overloads when compared to the other contingencies. This is due to 
shortage of paths to serve the loads available in this part of the 
system. Area-3 consists of numerous heavy loads making it a highly 
volatile area with the incidence of a contingency, as shown in Fig. 
11. 
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As Area-3 harbors numerous loads, it is apparent that additional 
generation might be needed to keep the system from plunging into a 
blackout. In order to relieve the lines from overloading, generation of 
50 MW at each of the buses 82, 92 and 93 is recommended. Table 7 
lists the different schemes considered for this outage. 
 
Fig. 11. Line 89-92 Outage 
TABLE 7. MITIGATION SCHEMES FOR LINE OUTAGE: 89-92 
Scheme 
(#) 
   Details of the 
      Scheme 
Loads 
Shed 
       Gen 
 Added 
1  Island 1- Area 1-2           0       50 MW 
1  Island 2- Area 3-4           0      150 MW 
2  Entire System           0      150 MW 
3  Island 1- Area 1-2           1            - 
3  Island 2- Area 3-4           3            - 
4  Entire System           3            0 
If islanding is opted, then Area 1-2 will require additional 
generation (50 MW) as well. But, non-islanded schemes works better 
with less generation added and fewer number of loads shed. 
V.  CONCLUSIONS 
Results obtained from the application of this technique indicate 
that it can be a powerful approach for the secure operation of power 
systems. A plan integrating three defense mechanisms -intentional 
islanding, distributed generation and automated load shedding was 
presented. Any combination of these schemes may be applied once 
an initiating cascading outage condition is predicted. The operator 
may be armed in this way with various possible mitigating schemes. 
It was observed, through case studies, that simply intentional 
islanding may not be the best choice to restore the system to an 
operable condition. But, if the need arises strategic islanding may 
prevent catastrophic situations. Island boundaries tend to vary with 
the outages. In some case, particularly when multiple security 
violations, such as overloads and undervoltages are noticed, the only 
possible scheme to keep the system operating is to island certain 
buses. 
Each island may have its own share of overloads and 
undervoltages. The island ties are predominantly heavily loaded 
lines, making them excellent candidates for defining island 
boundaries. During system disturbances, these lines may violate their 
limits, causing them to sometimes trip. By defining them as the 
island ties, forced outage of these lines is in fact conducive to the 
situation. 
The final outputs of this technique are independent islands 
capable of operating under reduced generation or load conditions for 
each of the critical line outages. This study takes a step toward 
proving that most cascading failures are avoidable but at some cost. 
Although, load shedding works effectively in most cases, intentional 
islanding helps in many cases to save the system from completely 
collapsing. 
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